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Abstract Researchers and policymakers emphasize that
people’s involvement in forest management can secure
their support of conservation initiatives. However, the
evidence on the effectiveness of top-down participation is
weak. This study uses cross-sectional household data from
16 villages in the buffer zone of Pench Tiger Reserve
(Madhya Pradesh) in India to contribute to the evidence
base of such assumption. Using a propensity score
matching to control for observable bias, we evaluate the
effects of two state-driven incentive-based participatory
projects, i.e. the Joint Forest Management and Ecodevel-
opment, on selected social outcomes. Specifically, we
measured local people conservation knowledge, biodiver-
sity attitudes as well as trust in and satisfaction with the
tiger reserve management authorities. We found that the
effects of participatory management on conservation
knowledge were positive, but negligible. We found no
significant effects on local people’s biodiversity attitudes,
trust and satisfaction with the tiger reserve management
authorities. Top-down and externally induced participation
may explain our results. Our findings clearly indicate that
the effectiveness of participatory conservation interven-
tions is conditional on the level and nature of local par-
ticipation. Top-down participatory projects may not be
sufficient to generate local support of conservation and in
some cases, they may even exacerbate local conflicts.
Keywords Decentralization  Integrated conservation and
development  Joint Forest Management  People–wildlife
interactions  Propensity score matching  Quasi-
experiment
Introduction
Researchers and policymakers emphasize that people’s
involvement in forest management can secure their support
of conservation initiatives (Brechin et al. 2002; Baral and
Heinen 2007; Pimbert and Pretty 1995). The governance
shift from socially exclusive conservation policies towards
more inclusive ones started in the 1980s through commu-
nity-based conservation and natural resource management,
co-management arrangements, and efforts to integrate
conservation and development (Reyes-Garcia et al. 2013).
In these conservation governance arrangements, participa-
tion can be directed to achieve different objectives, such as
manage conflicts among actors, provide legitimacy to
resource managers, reinforce democratic culture, allow
local voices to have a say in decisions concerning their
livelihoods or improve decision-making by supplying local
knowledge and values (Pretty 1995; Reed 2008; Young
et al. 2013). However, such a diversity of people-centred
conservation approaches shows varying levels of local
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people’s involvement and control over management deci-
sions, degrees of benefit sharing and the transfer of political
power from the state to local communities. Despite such
differences in using participation, there is evidence to
support that people’s participation in forest management
and conservation can modify their behaviour and attitude
towards biodiversity (Baral and Heinen 2007; Andrade and
Rhodes 2012), improve conservation knowledge (Berkes
2009), and increase trust towards protected area managers
(Richards et al. 2004; Young et al. 2013), ultimately
leading to positive changes in the biodiversity outcomes of
conservation efforts (see Persha et al. 2011).
In such a context, the relevant question is, ‘‘Which kind
of participation is necessary to obtain a change in social
and biodiversity outcomes?’’ A review of the literature
shows that participation means different things to different
people (Lawrence 2007; White 1996). The term ‘‘partici-
pation’’ has been used to refer to the attendance of a
meeting so that participants can obtain information or
benefits (passive participation), but also to self-mobiliza-
tion and proactive engagement in decision-making over
natural resources (active participation) (Agarwal 2001;
Arnstein 1969; Pretty 1995; Reed 2008; White 1996).
Participation can be an endogenous organic process led by
self-motivated local groups independent of government as
well as externally induced practice, promoted through
governmental policy action and implemented by the
bureaucrats (Mansuri and Rao 2013). However, these dif-
ferent types of people’s involvement might not have the
same effect on social and ecological conservation out-
comes, i.e. conservation-related knowledge, attitudes and
behaviour of local people, and biodiversity level (Agarwal
2001; Glaser et al. 2010; Persha et al. 2011).
Much of the literature on the topic has focused on bot-
tom-up participatory initiatives, analysing self-organized
groups of local people in managing resources (e.g. Ostrom
1990), but the research on the effects of externally induced
participation on selected social and ecological outcomes is
scarce. In this paper, we analyse two cases of state-driven
participatory interventions to see whether there is any
impact of top-down participatory approaches in conserva-
tion and natural resource management on social outcomes.
We use cross-sectional household data collected in the
buffer zone of the Pench Tiger Reserve (PTR), Madhya
Pradesh in India, and a quasi-experimental research design
to evaluate whether people’s involvement in forest man-
agement and conservation through two state-driven incen-
tive-based interventions, i.e. Joint Forest Management
(JFM) and Ecodevelopment (ED) projects, affects people’s
conservation knowledge, biodiversity attitudes, and trust in
and satisfaction with the park management authorities.
Participatory approaches to forest management and con-
servation implemented in PTR, sometimes with
geographical overlap, provide an ideal case to study: (1)
whether local people’s conservation knowledge and bio-
diversity attitudes vary between participants and non-par-
ticipants and (2) whether the type of top-down
participatory intervention (JFM or ED) matters in terms of
the selected outcomes. To test potential pathways between
people’s involvement and conservation outcomes, we use
findings of social psychology and attitudinal research
(Ajzen 2001; St John et al. 2010) to create a theory of
change that explains the links between the intervention,
attitudinal change and conservation impacts (see Online
Resource 1).
Case study
Forest conservation and management projects
in India
Over the last three decades, two interventions of the central
government have attempted to increase people’s involve-
ment in forest management and conservation in the human-
dominated forested landscapes of India: Joint Forest
Management and Ecodevelopment projects.
JFM is a collaborative arrangement between local peo-
ple and public entities to sustainably manage state-owned
forests outside of PAs (Nayak and Berkes 2008). JFM is a
top-down decentralization initiative (Kumar et al. 2014)
initiated by the central government in 1990 and prompted
by the National Forest Policy (GOI 1988) to recognize the
value of local people’s involvement in the natural resource
management and biodiversity conservation. At the local
level, JFM operates through committees installed in vil-
lages with assigned adjacent forest patches. In exchange for
‘‘social fencing’’, i.e. safeguarding, protection and
improvement of the forest, the forest department provides
villagers usufruct rights (negotiated), extraction of non-
timber forest products and the share of revenue from a
timber sale. Nevertheless, all the specific JFM arrange-
ments depend on the states, and they need to follow the
central government JFM rules. Now financed by the central
government through the national afforestation policy
scheme, the JFM initiative was initially partially funded by
various foreign agencies, including the World Bank (WB)
and the United Nations Development Programme, among
others (Singh et al. 2011).
In India, Integrated Conservation and Development
Projects (ICDPs) are known under the name of Ecode-
velopment projects. ED projects are implemented around
core zones of PAs with the main aim to conserve the core
of the PAs from human impacts. They operate under the
1972 Wildlife (Protection) Act, which prohibits local
people to acquire usufruct rights from the core zones of
B. Macura et al.
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PAs. The India Ecodevelopment Project (IEDP) was
approved in 1996 and was actively funded until mid-2004
by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)/WB loan-
cum-grant with the contribution from beneficiaries (local
people), state and central governments. In total, USD 61
million was spent in five tiger reserves (protected areas
governed by the tiger conservation programme of the
Government of India called Project Tiger) and two
national parks, out of which 54 % was invested in the
village ecodevelopment project component (World Bank
2007). Village ecodevelopment was designed ‘‘to reduce
the negative impacts of local people on biodiversity and
increase collaboration of local people in conservation’’
through: ‘‘[…] participatory microplanning […], recipro-
cal commitments that foster alternative livelihoods and
resource uses […], special programmes for additional
joint forest management, voluntary relocation and sup-
plemental investments for special needs’’ (World Bank
2007, p. 2). After IEDP had ended, village ED continued
to be part of the management plans of many PAs, espe-
cially of tiger reserves, but with reduced funding.
Although both projects aim at promoting people’s
involvement in conservation, there are differences between
them. ED is designed to shift local forest-dependent people
away from the forests (of the PA core zones) and find them
alternative sources of livelihood (Badola 2000). JFM seeks
to involve locals in the forest protection more actively
where people have slightly more control over resource
management; they patrol their assigned forest patch and
can punish offenders. Yet, for both JFM and ED, it has
been argued that they treat local people as ‘‘beneficiaries’’
and the control over the majority of decisions is with the
forest department (Woodman 2002; Panigrahi 2006; Sarin
et al. 2003).
Existing evaluations of the two participatory conser-
vation interventions in India provide anecdotal evidence
of their effectiveness in conservation. For example, a few
case studies have produced some evidence that ED has no
measurable effects on conservation due to (1) lack of
genuine negotiation over benefits distribution between
local communities and PA authorities, (2) a poor under-
standing of project objectives by local people, and (3)
missing links between delivered incentives and obtained
conservation outcomes (Mahanty 2002; Arjunan et al.
2006; Gubbi et al. 2008; Dejouhanet 2010). JFM has been
more frequently evaluated than ED with mixed results
(e.g. Kumar 2002; Murali et al. 2002; Damodaran and
Engel 2003; Bhattacharya et al. 2010). However, such
evaluations can only be considered anecdotal because
such studies either measure only one type of outcome
(mostly ecological) without removing rival explanations
of the observed effects or do not adjust for selection bias
occurring due to non-random assignment of such
interventions (for a comprehensive review, see Shyam-
sundar and Ghate 2014). Rigorous studies that assess the
effects of participatory conservation interventions with the
causal inference are very rare (Lund et al. 2009; Miteva
et al. 2012), except for some recent evaluation studies of
the Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
(ICDPs) (Morgan-Brown et al. 2010; Weber et al. 2011;
Bauch et al. 2014), on devolution and community-based
management and conservation (Jumbe and Angelsen
2006; Ameha et al. 2014), and on payments for envi-
ronmental services (Hegde and Bull 2011). To our
knowledge, credible evaluation studies of JFM and ED in
India have not yet been conducted.
Study site
This research was conducted in the buffer zone of PTR, in
Seoni and Chhindwara districts of Madhya Pradesh. PTR
(Fig. 1) covers a total area of 1179.6 km2 divided between
a core (411.3 km2) and a buffer (768.3 km2) zones.
Although it was only included in Project Tiger in 1992, the
area has been under protection since 1977. The core zone
was officially proclaimed in December 2007 and the buffer
in October 2010, but until 2013 the buffer zone remained
under the control of three territorial divisions of the Mad-
hya Pradesh forest department (MPFD) and was gradually
handed to the wildlife wing of MDFP i.e. Pench Tiger
Reserve authorities.
The study area is an undulating terrain with small hill
ranges that supports three main forest types: southern
Indian tropical moist deciduous forest (slightly moist),
southern tropical dry deciduous forest (with teak Tectona
grandis), and southern dry mixed deciduous forest. The
core zone supports many species of high conservation
concern and represents critical tiger habitat, which is an
inviolate space ‘‘required for the sustenance of viable
populations of tiger and other wild animals’’ where no
human disturbance, habitation, resource extraction or
agriculture is allowed (MOEF 2007, p. 1). Given that the
Wildlife Protection Act governs PAs, extraction of forest
resources is strictly prohibited from a PA core zone and
there is no revenue sharing from such areas (except rev-
enue from tourism). The buffer zone is a multiple use area
with a lower degree of habitat protection where de jure
rights for resources access and cultivation have been
granted to local people.
Ninety-nine villages with around 60,000 people and
around 60,000 cattle are located within the first five kilo-
metres around the core zone. Twenty more villages are
located in the rest of the buffer zone. More than 60 % of
the local people are Adivasi (i.e. original inhabitants),
mostly belonging to the Gond tribal group. There is also a
smaller percentage of the scheduled caste and other
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backward caste. The main occupation of the local people is
(subsistence) agriculture and wage labour (mostly forest
related).
Joint Forest Management around PTR
The first JFM projects in Madhya Pradesh date back from
1991. There are two types of JFM committees depending
on the forest quality: (1) Village Protection Committee
(VPC) for reforestation of degraded lands with a forest
cover density below 40 % and (2) Forest Protection
Committee (FPC) for forest protection with a cover density
above 40 %. The forest quality also determines the revenue
sharing through committees. Committees have a ‘‘general
body’’ in which all the eligible village voters can (volun-
tarily) participate, and an ‘‘executive body’’ made of nine
to eleven villagers, a secretary from the MPFD (usually a
lower-rank forest officer) and a joint secretary from the
village. The committee president is elected. The committee
manages the funds, organizes the meetings, cooperates
with the MPFD during forest fires, informs them about
illegal activities, prepares and executes microplans with the
help of the MPFD, patrols the forest and can punish
offenders (MPFD 2014). Depending on the funding flow,
villagers also receive household utensils that could
decrease forest dependency (e.g. smokeless stoves,
blankets and LPG connections). Most JFM committees in
the Pench buffer zone are FPC.
Ecodevelopment around PTR
PTR was one of the selected sites where IEDP commenced
in 1996–1997. Up to 2005, this project released 268.6
million Indian rupees (approx. USD 6.1 million) in PTR
(Pench Tiger Reserve 2012). After IEDP funding ended in
2004/5, EDC remained in the villages albeit with consid-
erably lower activities and intermittent funding coming in
part from the federal and state funds allocated for the PA
management activities, and in part from the share of
tourism revenues (through the PTR development fund).
From 2005 to 2011, 13.1 million rupees (approx. USD
282,000) were spent for ecodevelopment in the PTR, which
is about 22 times lower than the amount spent in the period
1997–2005 (Pench Tiger Reserve 2012).
Ecodevelopment has been implemented through ecode-
velopment committees (EDCs) in ninety-nine villages in
the 5 km belt surrounding the PTR core zone. The structure
and the role of EDCs are very similar to VPCs and FPCs.
Involvement is voluntary. The EDC general body is com-
posed of all the eligible village voters. The executive body
is composed of a group of nine to eleven villagers
including the elected president and a secretary from the
Fig. 1 Study location. Pench Tiger Reserve (Madhya Pradesh) with surveyed villages
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PTR who usually is a lower-rank forest officer. Apart from
the bookkeeping, informing PTR staff about illegal activ-
ities, planning and execution of a microplan with help of
PTR staff, the EDC provides household-level benefits and
various assets to interested villagers (i.e. pressure cookers,
gas cylinders and stoves with improved efficiency, dung-
powered biogas plants, bicycles, sewing machines and field
banding). According to the project plan, beneficiaries need
to contribute 7–25 % of the household asset price (to
develop a sense of ‘‘ownership’’). EDC also provides vil-
lage-level infrastructure (i.e. ponds, wells, stop dams,
electric pumps for agricultural intensification, roads, com-
munity halls and stalls for meetings, game-proof wall). The
objective of these provisions is to decrease pressure on the
forests and to create alternative (non-forest) livelihoods.
After the IEDP funding ended, the PTR management
authorities have been occasionally distributing gas cylin-
ders, stoves, pressure cookers, organizing IT classes, and
conducting some minor activities in the villages. Although
the supply of these incentives theoretically depends on the
local demand, provision of benefits is limited by the
availability of PTR funding (National Tiger Conservation
Authority is a supervisory and coordination body of Project
Tiger that approves a plan of ED expenditure). The fund
availability conditions EDC activities, meeting frequency
(once or twice per year in some villages) and regularity of
benefit distribution (sometimes once per year). Thus, not
all households in a targeted village receive benefits, i.e.
occasionally around 10 % of all the households in a village
receive some assets.
Methods
Research design
Fieldwork was carried out between January and May
2014. We implemented a quasi-experimental design with
two-stage, random stratified and systematic sampling. In
total, we sampled 16 villages in the buffer zone of the
PTR. We selected villages according to several criteria.
First, half the villages selected had benefited from JFM
and the other half from ED projects. Second, we took into
account the intensity with which the projects were
applied: from a list containing all the ED villages in the
park surrounding, we randomly selected four villages with
high and four villages with a low amount of received
household- and village-level benefits. Using data from
Census of India (2011), we matched the JFM-participating
villages with the ED-participating villages on the popu-
lation size, ethnic and caste composition, literacy rate, the
number of non-workers. We also matched villages on
proximity to a forested area. Sixty per cent of sampled
villages were located within five kilometres from the core
zone. On average, we surveyed 20 households in each
village. First, we obtained a village map (or created one
ourselves) with marked and numbered households. Sec-
ond, among the first ten households counting from a
village entrance, we randomly selected a starting house-
hold (using random number generator function in Excel
spreadsheets) and sampled subsequent households at
intervals determined by a village size (Bernard 2006). If
there was more than one street in a village, we repeated
this procedure for every street.
We carried out face-to-face structured questionnaires
implemented by five non-local enumerators conversant in
Hindi (Madhya Pradesh official language) from a profes-
sional agency for social research. Enumerators received a
thorough four-day training to understand research objec-
tives, conservation context and questionnaires. The ques-
tionnaires were written in English, translated and
conducted in Hindi and pretested in two buffer zone vil-
lages, after which unclear and ambiguous questions were
removed. The data from the pilot were excluded from the
final results. Before administering questionnaires, enu-
merators obtained participant’s prior free informed oral
consent. Out of 320 collected questionnaires, 302 con-
tained complete data and were included in the final anal-
ysis. The questionnaires contained closed-ended and open-
ended questions and included demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the household, together with: (1)
perceptions of the ED or JFM project, (2) knowledge of the
tiger reserve rules and location, (3) attitudes towards bio-
diversity and (4) trust in and satisfaction with park
authorities.
Since a household head represents a household and is
the one who makes household-level decisions (especially
regarding project involvement and accruing benefits,
interaction with the FD, etc.), we administered question-
naires to household heads. If neither the male nor the
female household head was present (33.8 % of the sample),
we administered questionnaires to a person older than 21
(as younger household members might not have remem-
bered past activities of ED and JFM projects). Both ED and
JFM operate at a household and a village level, and we
collected household- and village-level data.
In addition to the questionnaires, we also collected rich
contextual and historical information on the projects’ past
and current functioning through over 30 semi-structured
interviews with committee members and MPFD staff. We
asked about activities of different internal and external
actors, possible conflicts between them, frequency and
attendance of meetings, the level of local people’s
engagement in the decision-making process, the distribu-
tion and demand of the village-level and household-level
assets. On average, each interview lasted for about an hour.
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Hypotheses and effects: from involvement
to behavioural change
Following our theory of change, to evaluate the effects of
top-down participation we measure several intermediary
effects through which participation can theoretically
influence local people’s behaviour and possibly affect
conservation success (see Fig. 1 in Online Resource 1).
Specifically, the selected outcomes include: (1) conserva-
tion-related knowledge; (2) attitudes towards biodiversity,
particularly, towards forests, tigers, and other wildlife; (3)
attitudes towards PTR managers and (4) trust in PTR
managers (Table 1).
As researchers have argued that people’s involvement in
forest management and conservation produces pro-con-
servation behavioural changes (Andrade and Rhodes 2012;
Persha et al. 2011), we expect that people living in
households that are included in any forest conservation
programme (either JFM or ED) would have more conser-
vation knowledge and more positive attitudes towards
biodiversity than people living in non-participating
households (H1).
Additionally, if the differences in involvement matters
and if the intensity of people involvement in conservation
was higher in ED-participating than in the JFM-partici-
pating villages, we expect to find more conservation-
Table 1 Measured outcomes and related questions for participant (both ED and JFM) and non-participant households
Measured constructs Constituting questions, scores and rating scales
A. Conservation knowledgea Do you know about Pench Tiger Reserve?—Yes (1)/No (0)
Do you clearly know where are the boundaries of the core zone?—Yes (1)/No (0)
Do you clearly know where are the boundaries of the buffer zone?—Yes (1)/No (0)
What is your definition of the buffer zone?—No knowledge (0), fair understanding (1), good understanding (2)
Which activities are banned in the core zone?—No knowledge (0), knows 1 rule (1), knows 2 rules (2), knows 3
rules (3)
Why do you think these activities are banned in the core zone?—No knowledge (0), fair understanding (1), good
understanding (2)
Which activities are allowed in the core zone?—No knowledge (0), fair understanding (1), good understanding
(2)
Scale reliability coefficient (a): 0.8253 (for H1) and 0.8085 (for H2)b
B. Attitudes towards
biodiversityc
Do you like or dislike:
Tiger?—Strongly dislike (1), dislike (2), neutral (3), like (4), like very much (5)
Other wild animals?—Strongly dislike (1), dislike (2), neutral (3), like (4), like very much (5)
Forests?—Yes (1)/No (0)d
Scale reliability coefficient (a): 0.5475 (for H1) and 0.5402 (for H2)
C. Attitudes towards PTR
authoritye
Taking everything into account, how satisfied are you with the Tiger Reserve management authority?—Very
unsatisfied (1), unsatisfied (2), neutral (3), satisfied (4), very satisfied (5)
D. Trust in PTR authoritye How much do you trust the Tiger Reserve management authority to work in your interest?—Not at all (1), not
very much (2), neutral (3), a fair amount (4), a lot (5)f
a Based on Olomı´-Sola` et al. (2012). Answers from open-ended questions 4, 5, 6 and 7 are coded into the different levels, assigning 0 score if a
respondent did not know or gave the wrong answer and 1 for every correct answer. Only one correct answer given by a respondent was coded as
‘‘fair knowledge/fair understanding’’, and two correct answers were coded as a ‘‘good knowledge/good understanding’’. Final knowledge score is
a sum of all the individual item scores divided by the highest aggregated score (=8)
b We assume that the awareness of park rules is more important for the compliance and conservation-oriented behaviour than the sole knowledge
of the PTR existence and its location. Therefore, we have assigned different weights to the constituting questions of the conservation knowledge
indicator
c Attitude is a summary evaluation, a level of a favour or disfavour towards an attitude object (Ajzen 2001). In our case attitude objects are tiger,
other wild animals, forests or park management authority. Following previous research on the topic (Macura et al. 2011; Allendorf and Allendorf
2013; Ajzen 2001) we measured attitudes through enquiries about liking or disliking attitude object
d Collapsed to 1/0 format as 89.4 % participants liked forests, i.e. assigned score 4 to the statement
e Attitudes and trust towards PTR management authority are relevant only for the H2 as people who are not participating neither in the JFM nor
in the ED most probably do not have frequent encounters with the PTR managers
f Based on Baral (2012). According to encapsulated interest theory, trust is relational and can be defined as ‘‘a tripartite relationship in which A
trusts B with respect to X’’ (Baral 2012, p. 43)
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related knowledge, more positive attitudes towards biodi-
versity, and an overall better relationship (attitudes and
trust) with PTR managers in ED-participating than in the
JFM-participating households (H2).
Empirical strategy
We estimated the causal effects of involvement in the state-
driven top-down participatory initiatives on selected out-
comes in two different ways. First, we calculated the
effects of the involvement in the ED and the JFM versus no
involvement, and second we calculated the effects of the
involvement in the ED versus involvement in the JFM. For
every outcome, we measured the average impact of pro-
jects on their participants. Hence, we focused on the
average treatment effect on treated (ATT), defined as the
difference between the average observed effect with the
involvement and the average counterfactual without the
involvement or with the involvement in an alternative
project (Dugoff et al. 2014; Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008)
(Eq. 1):
ATT ¼ E Yi  Y0jP ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ E YijP ¼ 1ð Þ  E Y0jP ¼ 1ð Þ
ð1Þ
where P = 1 denotes project participation, Yi is the out-
come of the participant household, Y0 is the counterfactual
outcome or the outcome of the same household if it had not
participated in the project (Ameha et al. 2014).
However, the obvious evaluation problem is that the
counterfactual (E = (Y0|P = 1)) is unobservable (a par-
ticipant cannot be a non-participant at the same time), and
thus, the researcher has to choose an appropriate substitute
to estimate it (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). As in con-
servation projects participants are not randomly assigned to
the treatment or they do not have an equal opportunity to
participate, selection bias or other factors that determine
the decision to participate might influence the observed
effects (Ferraro 2012). To overcome these issues and to
create a credible comparison, we apply the propensity score
(PS) matching (a statistical nonparametric method) for our
calculations. PS (Eq. 2) is a predicted probability of par-
ticipating in a project conditional on a set of observed
covariates (X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). PS is speci-
fied through a binary choice modelling (probit or logit).
Prob Xð Þ  Pr P ¼ 1jXð Þ ¼ E PjXð Þ ð2Þ
For testing H1, we created a treatment sample (de-
pendent variable = 1, N = 212) that includes those
households that (1) received household assets through
either ED or JFM; and/or (2) have been members of the
ED or JFM committees; or (3) were well aware of the
village-level activities executed through the aforemen-
tioned projects, even if they had not directly received any
household assets. Namely, all sampled villages were
exposed to the activities of either of the two projects, and
if not for their household, villagers have received some
development help for their village (a pond, a water tank
or road construction and repair, and similar). Therefore,
household heads that were aware and perceived some
benefits from these village-level activities were placed in
the treatment group. Households that did not have any
knowledge about any of the two projects and who never
received any benefits composed the control sample (de-
pendent variable = 0, N = 91). We did not distinguish
between households who received benefits before and
households who also received benefits after the GEF/WB
funding ended. For testing H2, we analysed a subsample
of the participants and evaluated differences in the effects
of ED (1, N = 118) versus JFM (0, N = 81).
We assume that the involvement in either of the two
projects (H1) will be driven by different factors (H2).
Therefore, we have two different sets of covariates to fit
two propensity specification models (see Table 1 in Online
Resource 2). To model involvement under H1, we com-
bined the following covariates: household size and wealth
index, household head’s gender, education and age,
received compensation for crop raiding and cattle loss,
village distance to the nearest forested area, and the PTR
core zone proximity. To model involvement under H2, we
included the following covariates in the model: household
head’s gender and education, monthly household cash
income per person, electricity, livestock possession, cattle
loss to wildlife, a participation of any member of a
household in non-forest-related groups and village distance
to the nearest forested area.
The choice of covariates was based on theoretical con-
siderations, results from previous research and data on
projects’ design and activities (see Online Resource 2). To
make sure covariates are not affected by the treatment, we
choose covariates that are stable or deterministic with
respect to time (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). Despite
some minor local differences, economic, social and insti-
tutional settings of all the sampled households are very
similar as data come from villages located relatively close
to each other (within the radius of approx. 70 km), all
villages are adjacent to a forest, and they have similar
economic and cultural background. Moreover, all data
were collected at the same time with the identical questions
to measure the effects for non-participants, ED and JFM
participants (see Table 1). Therefore, our study design
context complies with the criteria for inference from
observational studies with low (or no) bias (Heckman et al.
1998; Ferraro and Miranda 2014). The probit and logit
models, a justification for variable selection for both
models, information on matching algorithm and balance
diagnostics are available in Online Resource 2.
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Results
The sample before matching
We sampled 302 households in 16 villages, out of which
210 households had participated in either of the two pro-
jects, and 92 households were controls (non-participants).
The subsample of participants is composed of 81 JFM-
participating households and 118 ED-participating house-
holds. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics for the
unmatched samples.
In the total sample, average household size was 5.36
(SD = ±1.775) with 15.23 % of female heads. A little
over 45 % household heads did not have formal education.
Thirty-eight per cent of households reported a loss of
livestock to wild animals and 36.42 % received compen-
sation (at least once) for crop raiding or cattle loss. The
household wealth index was low (0.02 ± 1.013). Average
monthly cash income was 873INR (approx. USD 14.8 in
April 2014) per person in a household. The majority of
families owned livestock (74.83 %) and had electricity in
their house (90.73 %). Only a small percentage of house-
holds participated in non-forest-related groups (14.9 %).
Average distance from village to a nearest forest area was
1.34 km (±0.695).
When compared to the sampled non-participating
households, the monthly cash income and household
wealth index of participants were significantly higher (no
households reported ED or JFM to be their primary
employment source). A significantly higher percentage of
sampled participating households also received compen-
sation for cattle or crop loss and belonged to the villages
settled closer to a forested area and to the PTR core zone.
Sampled ED-participating households had a signifi-
cantly smaller percentage of female household heads,
livestock ownership, livestock loss to wildlife and a lower
proportion of participation in non-forest-related groups
than JFM-participating households. A significantly lower
number of sampled ED-participating households had
electricity and higher monthly cash incomes. Their villages
were significantly closer to the core zone but slightly more
distant (for 460 m on average) from a nearest forested area
than surveyed JFM-participating households.
In the total unmatched sample, conservation knowledge
was low, with an average score of 0.35 out of 1. Biodi-
versity attitudes were positive: 63.91 % of surveyed
households had positive attitudes towards tigers and
54.31 % towards other wildlife (sum of levels 4 and 5). A
little more than 98 % liked forests (this category was col-
lapsed from a scale of 1–5 to 1/0 format as 89.4 % sur-
veyed households assigned score 4 to this attitude
statement). Responses to questions concerning satisfaction
and trust towards park authorities could not be considered
as pertinent for the overall sample, as the majority of non-
participant households could not respond to these
questions.
An unmatched sample of participating households had
significantly higher knowledge scores (0.42 out of 1) than
non-participating households (0.19). Other outcomes were
not significantly different.
In sampled ED-participating households, conservation
knowledge was significantly higher than in surveyed JFM-
participating households (0.15 and 0.64 out of 1, respec-
tively). Biodiversity attitudes were not significantly dif-
ferent. Average scores of satisfaction and trust towards
park authorities were significantly lower in ED-participat-
ing households, where 33.89 % of surveyed households
were satisfied with PTR, in comparison with 45.68 % of
JFM-participating households (levels 4 and 5). Almost
36 % of ED-participating households trusted PTR to work
on their interests, as opposed to 46.91 % of JFM-partici-
pating households (levels 4 and 5).
Average effects of involvement in ED and JFM (H1)
When measuring the effect of involvement in either of the
projects, the conservation knowledge score was the only
significantly different outcome between matched partici-
pating and non-participating households (0.14,
SE = 0.052, t stat = 2.78) (Table 3). The participant
knowledge score was on average low (0.42 out of 1), but
still almost two times higher than the non-participant
knowledge score (0.28).
Differences in attitudes towards tigers, other wildlife
and forests were insignificant. For participating house-
holds, attitudes towards tiger and other wild animals
averaged 3.41 and 3.23 (on a scale of 1–5), respectively. In
non-participating households, attitudes towards tigers and
other wildlife were lower, but not statistically different
(3.18 and 3.02, respectively). Attitudes towards forests
were consistently very positive and 99 % of respondents in
both samples stated that they like forests.
Average effects of involvement in ED compared
to JFM (H2)
The only significant difference between households
involved in ED and JFM in the matched sample relates to
their knowledge about conservation (Table 4). Here the
difference is even higher than the one from H1
(mean = 0.41, SE = 0.056, t stat = 7.3). Average
knowledge score of ED-participating households was rel-
atively high (0.63 out of 1), while the score of JFM-par-
ticipating households was almost three times lower (0.22).
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Differences in attitudes towards tigers, other wildlife
and forests were insignificant in this subsample too. In ED-
participating households, attitudes towards tiger and other
wildlife averaged 3.44 and 3.30 (on 1–5 scale), respec-
tively. In JFM-participating households, attitudes towards
tiger were higher (3. 48 on a scale of 1–5), but attitudes
towards other wildlife were lower (3.04). Attitudes towards
forests were very positive in both subsamples (0.98 and 1
out of 1 in ED- and JFM-participating households,
respectively). JFM-participating households were slightly
more satisfied with and trusted in the PTR authorities.
However, these differences in satisfaction (0.46,
SE = 0.321, t stat = 1.42) and trust (0.26, SE = 0.312,
t stat = 0.84) were not statistically significant.
Discussion
Caveats
Before we discuss our findings, we identify caveats of this
work. (1) Although propensity score matching can produce
correct estimates even with small sample sizes (see Pir-
racchio et al. 2012), small statistical power may still
impede detection of small but significant effects. (2) As
with every matching exercise, our results depend on the PS
model specification (Caliendo and Kopeinig 2008). The
matching estimator might be biased if the project partici-
pation is driven by criteria other than ones observable to a
researcher. Although we attempted to include all observ-
able covariates in our PS model (by informing ourselves
about projects’ background and accounting for alternative
explanations of measured effects), we still might have
omitted some factors that simultaneously influenced
involvement and measured outcomes. To minimize bias
from unobserved variables, we ran different model speci-
fications with all potential variables, and we found that our
results remained robust with one exception: the signifi-
cance of the variable on attitudes towards tiger changed for
the H1-related model. (3) Our assessment of project effects
is based on the respondents’ perceptions, a measure which
might be considered less objective. Our proxy variables of
biodiversity attitudes, trust and satisfaction towards PTR
authority are coarse estimates, as they were measured with
a single question. In-depth understanding of the complex
issues such as biodiversity attitudes, institutional trust or
satisfaction requires qualitative or longitudinal data to
reflect the field situation more realistically. In this study,
we use qualitative interview data to explain and comple-
ment survey findings. (4) We collected survey data on
conservation knowledge and attitudes from one household
member. Since the specific living context (such as a
household) conditions respondent’s answers, we assumedT
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that these answers could represent the whole household.
However, we are not in a position to evaluate whether there
are individual-level differences within households. (5)
Responses to our survey questions might be biased because
interviewees tend to give socially desirable answers and we
might have over-reported or under-reported the results.
Nevertheless, we have taken all the necessary measures to
gain the interviewees’ trust so they feel more comfort-
able expressing their genuine opinions: we clearly
explained research objectives, guaranteed and respected
confidentiality and anonymity, and we asked sensitive
questions using the neutral wording. (6) We cannot gen-
eralize our findings for all of India, as we study a single PA
that is not particularly known for either success or the
Table 3 Effects of participation (in either ED or JFM) versus no participation (H1) (ATT)
Variable Sample Participating
households
Non-participating
households
Difference SE T stat
Conservation knowledge score (0–1) Unmatched 0.42 0.19 0.24 0.038 6.23
ATT 0.42 0.28 0.14 0.052 2.78***
Like tiger (1 = not at all, 3 = neutral, 5 = very
much)
Unmatched 3.40 3.39 0.01 0.117 0.07
ATT 3.41 3.18 0.23 0.174 1.33
Like other wild animals (1 = not at all,
3 = neutral, 5 = very much)
Unmatched 3.23 3.26 -0.03 0.124 -0.26
ATT 3.23 3.02 0.20 0.185 1.09
Like forest (1 = yes) Unmatched 0.99 0.97 0.02 0.016 1.45
ATT 0.99 0.99 0 0.034 0
Mean differences are shown for both matched and unmatched samples
Ten treated cases (3.3 % of the total sample) were dropped from this comparison due to a lack of common support and were not included in ATT
estimation
*** Stands for significance at 1 % level
Table 4 Effects of household participation in ED versus participation in JFM (H2) (ATT)
Variable Sample ED-participating
households
JFM-participating
households
Difference SE T stat
Knowledge score (0–1) Unmatched 0.64 0.15 0.49 0.031 15.84
ATT 0.63 0.22 0.41 0.056 7.3***
Like tiger (1 = not at all, 3 = neutral, 5 = very
much)
Unmatched 3.37 3.52 -0.15 0.137 -1.06
ATT 3.44 3.48 -0.04 0.247 -0.16
Like other wild animals (1 = not at all, 3 = neutral,
5 = very much)
Unmatched 3.30 3.15 0.15 0.146 1.02
ATT 3.30 3.04 0.25 0.252 1
Like forest (1 = yes) Unmatched 0.98 1 -0.02 0.014 -1.18
ATT 0.98 1 -0.02 0.013 -1.42
Satisfaction with the PTR authority (1 = not at all,
3 = neutral, 5 = very much)
Unmatched 2.71 3.20 -0.49 0.177 -2.74
ATT 2.72 3.18 -0.46 0.321 -1.42
Trust in the PTR authority (1 = not at all,
3 = neutral, 5 = very much)
Unmatched 2.65 2.96 -0.31 0.178 -1.74
ATT 2.66 2.92 -0.26 0.313 -0.84
Mean differences are shown for both matched and unmatched samples
Six treated cases (3 % of the total sample) were dropped from this comparison due to a lack of common support and were not included in ATT
estimation
*** Stands for significance at 1 % level
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failure of the ED project. Despite all the limitations of our
data, we argue that our results provide interesting food for
thought that can help guide future research in the field and
contribute to the limited evidence base on top-down par-
ticipation effects. Future research on the topic should aim
for greater statistical power, have robust baseline data and
include more detailed proxies of trust, conservation atti-
tudes and behaviour. Future evaluations should be further
improved by measuring not only social effects, but also
incorporating biophysical indicators of the impact, such as
forest cover change. In the following paragraphs, we dis-
cuss our survey findings supported by the qualitative data
from interviews with different PTR actors.
The effect of top-down participation
Although literature suggests that people’s involvement in
conservation might have a positive effect on social and
ecological outcomes (e.g. Andrade and Rhodes 2012), our
findings imply that the top-down externally induced par-
ticipation might not actually be effective in delivering
required conservation outcomes. Our results also suggest
short-term legacy of these interventions. Specifically, we
found that involvement in the two state-driven participa-
tory projects had an effect on the level of conservation
knowledge only. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect
was low, as knowledge about PTR existence; location and
regulations were relatively weak in the matched subsam-
ples. We have not found effects of involvement on people’s
conservation attitudes.
A small effect of top-down participation has several
implications for the analysed system. The low conserva-
tion-related knowledge might act as an obstacle for
engagement in a pro-conservation behaviour and rule
compliance (Schultz 2002). A closer look at the knowledge
variable reveals that only 21 % participant and 10.9 %
non-participant households could define ‘‘buffer zone’’.
Our qualitative interviews support findings of the survey
and showed how recent administrative changes connected
to the buffer zone expansion (in 2013 and 2014) created
some confusion, wherein locals were not aware of how
these changes might affect their rights and they feared
forced relocation. We argue that this finding reflects low
activity level of ED and JFM committees. If they were
fully functional co-management institutions, they would
probably facilitate interactions between locals and the PTR
staff and act as an arena for exchange and co-production of
knowledge, trust building and conflict resolution (see
Berkes 2009).
We found no effect of involvement on local people’s
biodiversity attitudes. Our findings concur with another
independent ED evaluation from Periyar Tiger Reserve
(Gubbi et al. 2008), where conservation attitudes could not
be explained by the project involvement but by previous
experience of human–wildlife conflict, among other fac-
tors. In our study, local people’s attitudes towards biodi-
versity were overall positive. However, locals hardly
perceived benefits of conservation interventions. Data from
interviews suggest that some local people perceive that
good enforcement and the ban on resource extraction from
the PTR core zone have resulted in higher wildlife abun-
dance and intensification of crop raiding in adjacent agri-
cultural fields. Moreover, villagers seemed frustrated to
frequent crop-raiding incidents. The everyday fight for
subsistence, such as defending fields from wild animals,
does not permit locals to have any free time for other
activities (Interview, forest villager, January 2014) and
therefore no time to attend EDC meetings. Locals involved
in ED project frequently perceive ED provisions to be
insufficient to offset these big costs connected to both park
access restrictions and agricultural losses (EDC member,
February 2014). They often demanded to fence their fields
and to be better compensated from crop raiding. Our
findings suggest that the top-down participation coupled
with high conservation-related costs would not be able to
generate sufficient support of locals towards conservation
practices. In another study, top-down participation in for-
mal forest conservation and management groups was even
negatively associated with peoples’ attitudes towards bio-
diversity (Macura et al. 2011). Moreover, dissatisfaction
with management policies and practice could easily
translate into a local collective action against conservation
(see Rastogi et al. 2014).
The difference a project makes
When comparing the outcomes of ED and JFM projects,
we found that despite the aforementioned differences in
projects’ objectives and design, there is possibly no real
distinction between the two projects at the implementation
level and vis-a`-vis the intensity and nature of participation.
Thus, we found no difference between the ED- and JFM-
participating households, except in the level of conserva-
tion knowledge. As hypothesized, ED-participating
households have higher levels of knowledge than the JFM-
participating households and this is not surprising. Vil-
lagers further away from the PTR might not necessarily
know the PTR boundaries or the resource access rules and
they also possibly have fewer encounters with the PTR
authorities. This finding concurs with other research
reporting conservation knowledge to be inversely associ-
ated with a residence distance from a PA (Ormsby and
Kaplin 2005; Olomı´-Sola` et al. 2012).
Both JFM and ED are designed as participatory projects.
Nevertheless, both of them are implemented in a top-down
way with passive engagement of participants (Hildyard
B. Macura et al.
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et al. 2001; Tiger Task Force 2005). Moreover, villagers
frequently identify the ED project with the actual MPFD,
where ED is seen as a one more way of forest access
control (Interview, local NGO member, March 2014; also
in Read 2015; Sarin et al. 2003). Scholars have interpreted
such types of participatory projects as a state-driven terri-
torialization (Ve´ron and Fehr 2011) and ‘‘recentralizing
while decentralizing’’ (Ribot et al. 2006). This perception
of control and reluctance of the forest department to give
real power to locals can be possibly explained with the
internal organizational structure and working culture of the
forest department. The forest department is responsible to
implement participatory strategies when, at the same time,
a strong sense of hierarchy is present within their own
organization (Lawrence 2007; Fleischman 2015; Guha
1997). According to Vemuri (2008), attitudinal changes of
forest department staff to prepare for the policy that
advocates social inclusion into the hierarchical system of
forest management did not happen. As the forest depart-
ment staff frequently lacks time and adequate training for
implementing the participatory activities, these initiatives
are never truly institutionalized (Fleischman 2015).
Moreover, changing from being an enforcement officer to
someone who has also to ‘‘talk to and drink tea together
with the villagers’’ is often an uneasy task (Interview, PTR
lower level forest officer-wildlife wing, March 2014).
Although ED and JFM are designed to create people’s
support for conservation and manage conflicts, data from
qualitative interviews show that these projects may even
have negative social impacts. Village and household ben-
efits and provisions used to be more abundant under IEDP,
but are now limited. This might have raised disappoint-
ments among locals. Moreover, qualitative data also
showed that EDC meetings, that are supposedly arenas to
negotiate benefits with MPFD or to make resource man-
agement decisions, are nowadays either non-existent or
very rare in both JFM and ED. When funding is available,
provisions are distributed (once per year/2 years) in a top-
down way and local demands (for example, fences against
crop raiding) are often not fulfilled. Moreover, when ben-
efits are available, internal conflicts may increase among
locals, as there are not enough provisions for everyone in
the village (e.g. 10 gas cylinders per a village of 300
households) (Informal interview, villager, January 2014).
Since EDC members are intermediaries between local
people and MPFD, they are often blamed for unfulfilled
demands or unequal distribution of benefits (Interview,
EDC member, January 2014), which may translate into
intra-community conflicts.
Giving incentives can change people’s conservation
values, as it has been observed in other cases (Garcı´a-
Amado et al. 2013). However, if not executed properly and
without active local participation, incentive-based
conservation can exacerbate local conflicts and existing
social differences, prompting the capture of benefits by
local elites, excluding the poor and marginalized parts of
the society (Balooni et al. 2010), instead of creating posi-
tive behavioural changes towards conservation.
Conclusions
Lessons learned from evaluating interventions that may
affect the conservation success, create local support and
mediate human–wildlife conflicts around tiger reserves can
be critical for the effective tiger conservation. According to
the recent tiger census from 2014 (Jhala et al. 2015), the
tiger population increased in India by 30.5 % (this increase
was also recorded in Madhya Pradesh). However, threats to
tigers are still intensifying (Wikramanayake et al. 2010),
especially outside of PA networks. Due to lack of space for
both tigers and humans, this increase in the tiger population
might also mean more human–wildlife conflicts (Rastogi
et al. 2012; Read 2015). Therefore, it is important to know
which interventions can generate local people’s support for
conservation efforts and under which conditions.
In this study, we measured impacts of top-down state-
induced participation on selected social outcomes, and we
found negligible effects. Our findings thus indicate that the
effectiveness of participatory conservation interventions is
conditional upon the level and nature of local participation.
Ever since 2004 and the local extinction of tigers in
Sariska, and later in Panna Tiger reserve, active social
inclusion and more attention to the local context are rec-
ognized to be of high importance for conservation and
long-lasting efforts to secure tiger survival (Tiger Task
Force 2005). A decade later, our findings, in line with the
other literature on the topic, suggest that strong participa-
tory rhetoric of the policies has not yet translated into
practice and that externally induced, top-down participa-
tion does not produce desired effects. This inertia might be
approached with the internal structural changes and
decentralization of the management agency, as their out-
dated training and historical role in exclusive policy
enforcement may not leave much space for active inclusion
of local people in forest conservation and management
(Lawrence 2007).
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